Files
ai-agent/internal/services/ai_agent_mcp_policy_test.go
T
t 2bbf42b741 refactor(auth): delegate access control to be-system
Remove Agent Desk users, roles, login sessions, tokens, and local permission persistence. Expose the backend as an embeddable ai-agent module with host-provided subject lookup and operation authorization callbacks, and complete the frontend/backend repository split.
2026-08-21 00:41:07 +08:00

40 lines
1.1 KiB
Go

package services
import (
"testing"
"code.tczkiot.com/wlw/ai-agent/internal/pkg/dto/request"
)
func TestValidateMCPToolRiskPolicyRejectsTrustedToolOverride(t *testing.T) {
_, err := validateMCPToolRiskPolicy(request.AIAgentMCPToolRequest{
ToolCode: "system/server_time",
RiskLevel: "write",
RequireConfirmation: true,
})
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected trusted system tool policy override to be rejected")
}
item, err := validateMCPToolRiskPolicy(request.AIAgentMCPToolRequest{
ToolCode: "system/server_time",
RiskLevel: "read",
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("validate trusted system tool policy: %v", err)
}
if item.Title != "获取当前时间" || item.RiskLevel != "read" || item.RequireConfirmation {
t.Fatalf("unexpected normalized trusted policy: %#v", item)
}
}
func TestValidateMCPToolRiskPolicyRequiresWriteConfirmation(t *testing.T) {
_, err := validateMCPToolRiskPolicy(request.AIAgentMCPToolRequest{
ToolCode: "crm/update_customer",
RiskLevel: "write",
})
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected write tool without confirmation to be rejected")
}
}